What is the Cyber Resilience Act and who does it apply to?
The Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) is Regulation (EU) 2024/2847. For the first time, it sets horizontal cybersecurity requirements for all products with digital elements placed on the EU single market. As a regulation, the CRA applies directly in every Member State; unlike NIS 2, it needs no national transposition. The text was published in the Official Journal on 20 November 2024 and has been in force since 10 December 2024 (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, EUR-Lex).
The underlying idea is simple: whoever sells a connectable product is responsible for its security across the entire lifecycle. That covers secure development, vulnerability handling after the sale and the reporting of actively exploited vulnerabilities. The CRA follows the pattern of the New Legislative Framework: essential requirements, conformity assessment, EU declaration of conformity, CE marking, market surveillance. Anyone familiar with the Machinery Directive or the Radio Equipment Directive will recognise the mechanics.
Scope: products with digital elements
The CRA applies to products with digital elements (PDE). Under Art. 3(1), these are software or hardware products, including their remote data processing solutions, whose intended purpose or reasonably foreseeable use involves a direct or indirect logical or physical data connection to a device or network. The definition is deliberately broad. Among other things, it covers:
- Controllers, HMIs, sensors and actuators with Ethernet, fieldbus or wireless interfaces
- Machines and plant components with remote maintenance access
- Embedded software, firmware, operating systems and apps
- Standard software such as ERP modules, engineering tools or libraries, where supplied commercially
- Cloud back ends that are necessary for the product to function (remote data processing)
What matters is placing the product on the EU market, not where the company is based. A manufacturer in Switzerland or the United States is subject to the CRA as soon as it offers products on the single market. You can find out in a few minutes whether your specific product is in scope with our CRA applicability check.
Exemptions
Art. 2 exempts products already covered by sectoral legislation with equivalent cybersecurity requirements. These include medical devices and in vitro diagnostics (MDR/IVDR), motor vehicles under Type-Approval Regulation (EU) 2019/2144, civil aviation products and marine equipment. Also exempt are products developed exclusively for national security or defence purposes, and non-commercial open-source software. Suppliers should take care: a controller that is installed both in a type-approved vehicle and in an agricultural machine falls under the CRA for the second use.
Roles: manufacturer, importer, distributor, steward
The CRA allocates obligations by economic operator. The heaviest burden falls on the manufacturer (Art. 13). The authorised representative (Art. 18) performs tasks set out in a written mandate for manufacturers outside the EU, such as keeping the documentation available. The importer (Art. 19) may only place compliant products on the market and must verify that the conformity assessment, documentation and CE marking are in place. The distributor (Art. 20) checks formal features such as the CE marking and contact details and may not sell products it believes to be non-compliant. Open-source software stewards (Art. 24) are subject to a light-touch regime with a cybersecurity policy and cooperation on vulnerabilities, but no CE marking.
Important for OEM business: anyone who markets a product under their own name or trademark, or substantially modifies it, becomes a manufacturer with all the associated obligations (Art. 21 and 22). This applies to private-label products as much as to system integrators who reconfigure purchased components and ship them with their own firmware.
CRA deadlines: when each obligation takes effect
The CRA applies in stages (Art. 71). Two deadlines have already passed; the decisive one is still ahead. All the details and a deadline calculator are available under CRA timeline at a glance.
Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 enters into force 20 days after publication in the Official Journal. From this point, manufacturers have three years to prepare.
Art. 35 to 51 apply. Member States can notify assessment bodies so that they can build capacity for class I and class II products by the end of 2027.
Manufacturers report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents via the ENISA single reporting platform. This also applies to legacy products (Art. 69(2)).
All remaining obligations apply: essential requirements, conformity assessment, documentation, CE marking. Products without evidence of conformity may no longer be placed on the market.
Under Art. 69, products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 only fall under the full CRA requirements if they undergo a substantial modification after that date. The reporting obligations, by contrast, have applied to all products on the market since September 2026. These are the three reporting deadlines you have had to meet since then:
For severe incidents, the final report is due one month after the 72-hour notification. Reports are submitted once via the ENISA platform and are routed to the CSIRT of the Member State in which the manufacturer has its main establishment (Art. 16). How to set up the process internally is described on the page CRA reporting obligations.
Manufacturer obligations under Art. 13
Art. 13 brings together the manufacturer's obligations. If you want to tackle the CRA requirements as a manufacturer in a structured way, think of them in three blocks: development, lifecycle and evidence.
Development
- Cybersecurity risk assessment (Art. 13(2) and (3)): before placing the product on the market, you assess its risks and document which requirements of Annex I Part I apply. The assessment becomes part of the technical documentation and must be kept up to date throughout the support period.
- Implement the essential requirements of Annex I Part I (product properties) and Part II (vulnerability handling).
- Due diligence on third-party components (Art. 13(5)): purchased components, including open-source libraries, must not compromise the security of the product. This calls for selection criteria, vulnerability checks and feedback to the component manufacturer.
Lifecycle
- Support period (Art. 13(8)): at least five years or, if longer, the expected product lifetime. For industrial components with 15 years in service, that means 15 years of vulnerability handling.
- Security updates must be provided free of charge, without delay and throughout the support period; once published, updates remain available for at least ten years or until the end of the support period.
- Reporting obligations under Art. 14, and informing users about incidents and corrective measures.
Evidence
- Draw up the technical documentation under Annex VII before placing the product on the market and keep it for ten years after placing on the market or until the end of the support period, whichever is longer.
- Carry out the conformity assessment using the procedure prescribed for the product class (Art. 32).
- Issue the EU declaration of conformity (Annex V) and affix the CE marking (Art. 30).
- Supply the user information under Annex II: point of contact for vulnerabilities, support period, secure configuration, update mechanism, SBOM access on request.
A full breakdown with audit questions is available under CRA requirements in detail.
Essential requirements: Annex I Part I and Part II
Annex I is the technical core of the CRA. Part I describes what the product must look like. Part II describes how the manufacturer handles vulnerabilities. The requirements are technology-neutral; their concrete form will come from harmonised standards and, until then, from the state of the art and your risk assessment.
| Part | Requirement | What it means in practice |
|---|---|---|
| I | No known exploitable vulnerabilities at delivery | SBOM-based vulnerability scan before every release, release gate in the build. |
| I | Secure by default | Secure factory configuration, no default passwords, unnecessary services disabled, reset to a secure state possible. |
| I | Security updates including rollback | Signed updates, automatic installation as an option, fallback to the last working version, user notification. |
| I | Access control | Authentication, identity and access management, reporting of unauthorised access attempts. |
| I | Confidentiality and integrity | State-of-the-art encryption of stored and transmitted data, protection against manipulation of data, commands and configuration. |
| I | Data minimisation | Process only the data needed for the product's function. |
| I | Availability and resilience | Protection against DoS, limiting the impact on other devices and networks. |
| I | Attack surface minimisation | Limit external interfaces, hardening, exploit mitigations. |
| I | Logging | Record security-relevant events, with an opt-out for the user. |
| I | Data deletion | Users can securely and permanently remove and transfer data and settings. |
| II | Identify and document vulnerabilities | SBOM at least at the level of top-level dependencies, machine-readable. |
| II | Remediate vulnerabilities without delay | Risk-based prioritisation, patch process with defined target times. |
| II | Regular security testing | Static analysis, fuzzing, penetration tests depending on risk. |
| II | Public information on fixed vulnerabilities | Security advisories with description, impact, remediation; VEX documents for affected and unaffected components. |
| II | Coordinated vulnerability disclosure | Published CVD policy, point of contact for reports from researchers and customers. |
| II | Distribute updates | Secure distribution, free of charge and without delay; security updates separate from functional updates where technically feasible. |
For industrial components, IEC 62443-4-1 (development process) and 62443-4-2 (component requirements) are the obvious building blocks for demonstrating compliance with Annex I. How the two worlds fit together is explained under IEC 62443 and the CRA.
Product classes and conformity assessment
Not every product needs external assessment. Art. 32, together with Annexes III, IV and VIII, assigns products to four tiers. The classification determines whether you may declare conformity yourself or must involve a notified body.
| Tier | Examples | Conformity assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Default | The vast majority: industrial controllers without security functions, sensors, apps, ERP software, most machine components | Internal control, module A (self-assessment) |
| Important products class I (Annex III) | Identity and access management, password managers, browsers, VPN software, network management, SIEM, boot managers, PKI software, physical network interfaces, consumer routers, modems and switches, microprocessors, microcontrollers, ASICs and FPGAs with security functions, smart home devices, connected toys, wearables | Module A only where harmonised standards, common specifications or a European certification are applied in full; otherwise module B+C or module H with a notified body |
| Important products class II (Annex III) | Hypervisors and container runtimes, firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems, tamper-resistant microprocessors and microcontrollers | Always a notified body: module B+C or module H |
| Critical products (Annex IV) | Hardware security modules, smart meter gateways, smartcards and secure elements | European cybersecurity certification (CSA scheme) once mandated by delegated act; until then as class II |
Module B+C means EU-type examination by the notified body plus internal production control; module H is full quality assurance with a certified process. For manufacturers with many product variants, module H is often more economical. Since no harmonised standards have yet been cited in the Official Journal, a notified body is currently, in practice, the safe route for class I products. Plan assessment capacity early; the number of notified bodies is still limited in 2026. Classification guidance covering all Annex III categories is available on the page CRA product classes.
SBOM and vulnerability management
The software bill of materials (SBOM) is the inventory of all software components in a product. Annex I Part II(1) of the CRA requires it in a commonly used, machine-readable format, at least at the level of direct (top-level) dependencies. The SBOM does not have to be published, but it is part of the technical documentation and must be made available to market surveillance authorities on request. CycloneDX and SPDX have become the established formats in practice; BSI TR-03183 Part 2 defines mandatory and optional fields and goes beyond the CRA minimum by requiring full dependency depth.
The SBOM is a means, not an end. The actual process looks like this:
- Generate: produce the SBOM automatically in the build; for firmware, add binary analysis to capture statically linked libraries.
- Match: check components continuously against vulnerability databases (NVD, GitHub Advisories, vendor feeds), not just at release.
- Assess: is the vulnerability actually reachable in the product? Document the result as VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) so customers do not have to ask about every CVE.
- Fix and communicate: patch by risk priority, publish an advisory, roll out the update. Where a vulnerability is being actively exploited, the 24-hour reporting obligation applies in parallel.
- Receive: publish a CVD policy with contact address, response times and how researchers are handled; feed incoming reports into the same process.
For machine builders using purchased controllers, this means: require SBOMs and VEX documents from your suppliers contractually. Without this data you cannot meet your due diligence obligation under Art. 13(5).
Technical documentation, CE marking and open source
Technical documentation under Annex VII
The technical documentation is the evidence that you have met your obligations. It contains the product description including software versions and interfaces, the cybersecurity risk assessment, a description of design and development, the vulnerability handling process with SBOM and CVD policy, the list of standards applied or alternative solutions, test reports and the EU declaration of conformity. It must be complete before the product is placed on the market and maintained throughout the support period. Many manufacturers underestimate the effort: the documentation is not a closing document but a living artefact that grows with every release.
EU declaration of conformity and CE marking
With the EU declaration of conformity under Annex V, the manufacturer assumes responsibility for conformity. It states the product, the manufacturer, the legislation and standards applied and, for module B+C or H, the notified body. The CE marking under Art. 30 is affixed to the product, its packaging or, for software, to the declaration of conformity or the website. Where a CE marking already exists under other legislation (Machinery Regulation, Radio Equipment Directive, Low Voltage Directive), the CRA is added to the same declaration as a further legal act. Check whether your existing conformity processes cover software releases; hardware-centric CE processes often do not.
Open source
Free and open-source software that is not supplied in the course of a commercial activity is exempt from the CRA. As soon as a company offers open-source software commercially, for example as part of a product, with paid support or as a hosted service, the CRA applies in full. In between sits the open-source software steward under Art. 24: foundations and organisations that systematically support open-source projects without monetising them. They must document a cybersecurity policy, cooperate with authorities on vulnerabilities and meet reporting obligations from 11 December 2027, but are spared CE marking and fines. For manufacturers, the flip side applies: open-source components in your own product are third-party components within the meaning of Art. 13(5). Responsibility for their vulnerabilities lies with you, not with the project.
Harmonised standards and BSI TR-03183
Harmonised standards trigger the presumption of conformity: anyone who applies them in full is deemed compliant with the requirements they cover and may remain in self-assessment for class I products. To this end, the Commission has issued standardisation request M/606 to CEN and CENELEC; the work is being carried out in JTC 13. Three horizontal standards are planned (principles, general security requirements, vulnerability handling) along with more than 15 vertical product standards for the categories in Annexes III and IV.
Status as of 26 October 2026: no harmonised CRA standard has yet been cited in the Official Journal of the EU. The dates have been postponed several times; publication of the first horizontal standards is expected between Q4 2026 and 2027, with citation in the Official Journal following later. Manufacturers should not wait for the standards but work on the basis of the draft versions, the Commission guidelines of July 2026 and established standards such as IEC 62443-4-1/4-2 and ETSI EN 303 645. We keep the current status up to date under Status of the harmonised CRA standards.
As practical guidance for Germany, the BSI, the German Federal Office for Information Security, has published Technical Guideline TR-03183 "Cyber Resilience Requirements for Manufacturers and Products". Part 1 describes general requirements and translates Annex I into verifiable measures. Part 2 defines minimum content and formats for SBOMs. Part 3 covers vulnerability reports and notifications. The TR is not a harmonised standard and does not trigger a presumption of conformity, but it is the most concrete German benchmark available and is used by assessment bodies and customers as a reference (BSI: Cyber Resilience Act). Check the current version before applying it; the BSI continues to develop the individual parts.
Penalties and market surveillance
Fines under Art. 64: infringements of the essential requirements in Annex I and of Art. 13 and 14 carry fines of up to € 15 million or 2.5 % of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher. Infringements of other obligations are penalised with up to € 10 million or 2 %, and incorrect or misleading information provided to authorities with up to € 5 million or 1 %. Add to this recalls, sales bans and, for products carrying a CE marking under other legislation, the loss of marketability altogether.
Market surveillance is organised nationally (Art. 52). Authorities may request documentation, test products and, in the event of non-conformity, order corrective measures, withdrawal or recall. In Germany, a national CRA implementing act is being drafted to regulate responsibilities and fine proceedings; as of October 2026 the division of responsibilities between the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) and the BSI has not been finalised and should therefore be regarded as planned. For reporting obligations, the BSI as Germany's CSIRT is the addressee. Regardless of the German act, one thing holds: the fine ranges are set out in the regulation itself and apply directly from 11 December 2027.
A second risk lies in the supply chain. Customers that themselves fall under NIS 2 must demonstrate supply-chain security and will demand CRA conformity contractually. Which obligations arise from the two sets of rules and where they overlap is shown in our comparison CRA vs NIS 2.
Implementation roadmap for manufacturers
A good 13 months remain until full application. For a typical product portfolio in machine building or automation that is tight, but achievable if you prioritise. This roadmap has proven itself in our projects.
Take an inventory of the product portfolio, check each product for CRA applicability and exemptions, determine the product class under Annex III/IV and define the conformity assessment procedure. Outcome: a list of which products must be able to demonstrate conformity by the end of 2027 and which will be phased out before then.
Carry out the risk assessment for the prioritised products and rate every requirement in Annex I Part I and Part II: met, partially met, open. Mirror the development process against IEC 62443-4-1 or TR-03183. Outcome: a prioritised list of measures with effort and owners.
Activate the reporting process under Art. 14 (already in force), anchor SBOM generation and vulnerability monitoring in the build, publish a CVD policy, bring the update mechanism and secure-by-default configuration into the product, and extend supplier contracts with SBOM/VEX obligations.
Build the technical documentation under Annex VII, engage a notified body for class I/II, add the EU declaration of conformity and CE marking, and produce the user information under Annex II. Then: transfer the support-period obligations into operations.
The order is deliberate: steps 1 and 2 take a few weeks and provide the basis for budget and resourcing decisions. Step 3 is the real development effort and depends heavily on the maturity of your secure development lifecycle. In practice, step 4 rarely fails on the technology but on a lack of assessment capacity; book notified bodies early.
Next steps
Start with the CRA applicability check to classify your portfolio, and use the deadline calculator under CRA timeline to see which obligations already apply to you. If you need a robust gap analysis and a roadmap to December 2027, Blue Panther supports you with CRA consulting from classification through to technical documentation.

