Annex I at a glance
The CRA requirements are not found in the articles of the Cyber Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847) but in Annex I. Art. 13(1) obliges manufacturers to design, develop and produce products with digital elements so that they meet the essential requirements in Annex I Part I, and Art. 13(6) to put in place the vulnerability handling processes in Part II. Both parts apply from 11 December 2027 to all product classes alike, from the industrial sensor to the firewall. Only the way conformity is demonstrated differs by product class.
Part I describes properties of the product: how it is delivered, how it protects data, how it is updated. Part II describes processes of the manufacturer: how it finds, fixes and discloses vulnerabilities and distributes updates. The difference matters for the organisation. Part I lands with engineering, Part II with product management, product security and support. Both must be demonstrated in the technical documentation under Annex VII.
The risk assessment under Art. 13(2) as the starting point
Before you implement a single requirement, the CRA demands a cybersecurity risk assessment. Art. 13(2) requires the manufacturer to carry it out, document it and take it into account during planning, design, development, production, delivery and maintenance. Under Art. 13(3), the assessment must cover the risks over the expected product lifetime and justify which requirements from Annex I Part I point 2 are applicable and how they are implemented. It becomes part of the technical documentation and, under Art. 13(4), must be updated when the product or the threat landscape changes.
This is more than a formality. The risk assessment is the document with which you justify to a notified body or to market surveillance why your fieldbus module does not need link-level encryption, or why a device without a user interface does not offer a data deletion function. If the justification is missing, the requirement is deemed not met. A proven structure:
- Describe the intended purpose and reasonably foreseeable misuse, including the operating environment and data connections.
- Identify protection goals and assets: data, functions, availability, impact on other systems.
- Model threats and attack paths, for instance with STRIDE or according to IEC 62443-4-1 Practice 2.
- Map each requirement from Part I point 2: applicable and implemented, applicable and covered by measure X, or not applicable with justification.
- Evaluate and sign off residual risks, with date and responsible person.
Annex I Part I: product properties
Part I point 1 contains the general clause: the product must be designed, developed and produced so that it ensures an appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the risks. Point 2 specifies this in individual requirements that apply "where applicable". The table translates each requirement into practice and names the evidence an assessment body expects to find in the documentation.
| Requirement (Part I point 2) | What it means in practice | Evidence in the documentation |
|---|---|---|
| (a) No known exploitable vulnerabilities when made available | Before every release, the product and its components are checked against vulnerability databases; known exploitable vulnerabilities are closed or demonstrably mitigated. | Release checklist, SBOM scan report, dated release approval record |
| (b) Secure by default configuration with reset option | No default passwords, unnecessary services and ports disabled, secure factory settings; users can reset to this state. Deviation only by individual agreement with business customers. | Configuration baseline, hardening guide, factory reset test evidence |
| (c) Vulnerabilities can be addressed through security updates, automatic updates as default with opt-out | A secure update mechanism exists; where appropriate, security updates are installed automatically, users are notified and can postpone or opt out. A rollback to the last working state is considered state of the art. | Update architecture, signing concept, description of update behaviour in the user information |
| (d) Protection from unauthorised access | Authentication, identity and access management, roles, logging of access attempts; multi-factor authentication where the risk requires it. | Access concept, role matrix, authentication test report |
| (e) Confidentiality of stored and transmitted data | State-of-the-art encryption for data at rest and in transit, secure key management. | Cryptography concept with algorithms and key lengths, key management |
| (f) Integrity of data, commands, programs and configuration | Signed firmware, secure boot, integrity checking of configuration and communication, reporting of detected tampering. | Secure boot concept, signature chain, test evidence |
| (g) Data minimisation | The product processes only data that is necessary for its function. | Data flow diagram, justification per data category |
| (h) Availability of essential functions, including after an incident | Resilience against denial of service, resource limits, defined safe state in the event of a fault. | Robustness tests, fuzzing reports, description of failure behaviour |
| (i) Minimal negative impact on other devices and networks | The product cannot serve as an amplifier or entry point for attacks on third parties; network load is limited. | Documented network behaviour, test evidence |
| (j) Limited attack surface | Only necessary external interfaces are active; debug ports and developer access are disabled in series production. | Interface list with justification, hardening evidence |
| (k) Limited impact of exploitation | Exploit mitigations such as memory protection, privilege separation, sandboxing, least privilege. | Architecture description, compiler and platform settings |
| (l) Logging of security-relevant events with opt-out | Access, changes and errors are recorded and can be exported; users can disable the function. | Logging concept, event catalogue, export format |
| (m) Secure and easy deletion of all data and settings | Users can permanently remove data and, where needed, transfer it securely to another product. | Description of the deletion function, test evidence |
Every row of the table must be traceable to a decision in the risk assessment.
Annex I Part II: vulnerability handling
Part II is addressed not to the product but to the manufacturer. The eight requirements apply for the entire support period you define under Art. 13(8): at least five years, or the expected product lifetime if that is shorter. Anyone selling a product with a 15-year lifetime today must operate the processes for 15 years.
| Requirement (Part II) | What it means in practice | Evidence in the documentation |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Identify and document vulnerabilities and components, including an SBOM | A software bill of materials (SBOM) in a machine-readable format, covering at least the top-level dependencies; continuous matching against vulnerability databases. | SBOM per version (for instance CycloneDX or SPDX in line with BSI TR-03183 Part 2), monitoring process description |
| 2. Address vulnerabilities without delay, security updates separate from functionality updates | Defined response times by severity; security updates can be installed without new features so that operators can approve them quickly. | Vulnerability process with SLAs, release policy, example history |
| 3. Regular and effective tests and reviews | Static analysis, dependency scans, fuzzing, penetration tests at fixed intervals and before releases. | Test plan, test reports, remediation evidence |
| 4. Publish information about fixed vulnerabilities | Once an update is available, a security advisory is published with description, affected products, impact, severity and remedy; a delay is permitted only for security reasons. | Advisory template, publication location, machine-readable format such as CSAF |
| 5. Coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) policy | A public CVD policy describes how researchers report vulnerabilities, which deadlines apply and how the manufacturer responds. | Published CVD policy, security.txt, internal procedure |
| 6. Facilitate the sharing of vulnerability information, provide a contact address | A reachable point of contact for vulnerability reports, including reports concerning third-party components. | Contact address in the user information and on the website, handling records |
| 7. Mechanisms for the secure distribution of updates | Updates are signed, distributed via a secured channel and verified before installation. | Update infrastructure, signing concept, key management |
| 8. Distribute security updates without delay, free of charge and with advisory messages | Updates are provided without delay and at no charge, accompanied by information on risks and measures. Exception only for individually agreed products for business customers. | Distribution process, communication template, evidence of availability over the support period |
Part II is closely linked to the reporting obligation under Art. 14. Anyone who operates the point of contact, the vulnerability process and the advisory procedure from Part II has built two thirds of the reporting process. Without them, you usually learn of active exploitation from the press.
Relation to IEC 62443-4-1, 4-2 and BSI TR-03183
As long as no harmonised standard for the CRA has been cited in the Official Journal, there is no presumption of conformity. There are, however, recognised standards that describe the state of the art and that assessment bodies accept as an evidence structure. For manufacturers in the industrial sector, these are above all three documents:
- IEC 62443-4-1 describes the secure product development lifecycle with eight practices: security management, specification of security requirements, secure by design, secure implementation, verification and validation, management of security-related issues, update management, security guidelines. Practices 6 and 7 cover Part II almost completely; Practice 2 provides the structure for the risk assessment under Art. 13(2).
- IEC 62443-4-2 defines technical component requirements along the seven foundational requirements (identification and authentication, use control, system integrity, data confidentiality, restricted data flow, timely response to events, resource availability). These map almost one to one to Part I point 2 letters (d) to (l). The chosen security level (SL 1 to 4) justifies the scope of the measures.
- BSI TR-03183 is the BSI's practical guidance on the CRA: Part 1 describes general requirements for manufacturers, Part 2 the SBOM format with mandatory fields, Part 3 the requirements for vulnerability reports. Part 2 in particular has established itself as the de facto standard for SBOMs in Germany.
Important: none of these standards covers the CRA completely. IEC 62443-4-1 has no reporting obligation to authorities and no SBOM requirement in today's form; IEC 62443-4-2 has no deletion function and no data minimisation. Anyone already working to IEC 62443 creates a mapping table and closes the gaps in a targeted way. More on this on the page on IEC 62443.
Evidence in the technical documentation
Everything the tables above list in the "Evidence" column belongs in the technical documentation under Annex VII. It must be complete before placing on the market, be kept for ten years after placing on the market or until the end of the support period, and be made available to market surveillance on request. Annex VII requires at least: a general description of the product with intended purpose and software versions, a description of design and development including the vulnerability handling processes, the risk assessment, information on the support period, the standards or specifications applied, test reports and the EU declaration of conformity under Annex V.
- A requirements matrix that maps each row of Annex I to a measure, an evidence document and a test result.
- Versioned documents with a clear reference to the product version; documentation for "the product" without a version state cannot be assessed.
- The user information under Annex II as a separate document: manufacturer, point of contact, support period, installation instructions, update behaviour, deletion function.
- One owner per document and a review cycle tied to releases and to changes in the threat landscape.
Next steps
Start with the risk assessment under Art. 13(2), because without it you cannot justify which requirements apply. In parallel, check which product class your product falls into, because that determines the route to demonstrating conformity, and keep the deadlines in view. In our CRA consulting, we prepare the gap analysis against Annex I with you, build the requirements matrix and set up SBOM and vulnerability processes so that they work in everyday development.

